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Abstract
Motivated by the links between terror and crime and the difficulty in directly detect-
ing terror activity, we formulate and solve a resource allocation problem on overlapping
networks to determine if interdiction efforts may be able to take advantage of these
connections. The government, knowing only the general structure and overlap of the
networks, allocates its scarce resources to investigate each terror and criminal net-
work. There are two stages to the investigation: an initial investigation of all nodes
(i.e., terrorists or criminals) and a secondary investigation of criminals identified dur-
ing the initial investigation to determine if they are terrorists. Applying our model to
data derived from a population of terrorists in the United States between 1971–2003
suggests that the government may be able to exploit the terror connections of crimes
that are relatively uncommon, somewhat easy to detect, and are attractive to terrorists.
Keywords: networks, optimization, counterterrorism
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Terrorists carry out many activities leading up to an attack – including meetings to
plan the logistics of an operation and surveillance of potential targets – that by their na-
ture are difficult to detect. While some terrorists may avoid criminal activities for rea-
sons of security or ideology (O’Neil, 2007), there are many reasons why they become in-
volved with crime. To carry out an attack, terrorists might need to obtain weapons or
explosives (Jordan and Horsburgh, 2005). Terrorists obtain false documents and launder
money to obscure their identities (O’Neil, 2007). Funds may be raised through legitimate
means (Morselli and Giguere, 2006) or via drug dealing, petty theft, bank robbery, credit
card fraud, or selling contraband merchandise (O’Neil, 2007; Jordan and Horsburgh, 2005;
Morselli, Gigue`re, and Petit, 2007; Smith, Damphousse, and Roberts, 2006). The perceived
recent increase in the overlap between terror and crime may be due to the decline in the
state sponsorship of terror and the decentralization of terror networks (O’Neil, 2007). Terror
and criminal networks are covert or dark networks (Raab and Milward, 2003), and there-
fore face a tradeoff between secrecy and efficiency (Morselli et al., 2007). Criminal networks
are primarily profit driven and must sacrifice secrecy for efficiency (Morselli et al., 2007),
while terrorists put a higher premium on maintaining secrecy at the expense of efficiency
(Morselli et al., 2007; Krebs, 2002).
These observations suggest that there are significant connections between terror and
crime, and that the government should find it more difficult to detect terror activities than
criminal activities. In this paper, we analyze the overlap among terror and criminal net-
works to determine if the government can exploit these connections to more effectively iden-
tify terrorists. We formulate and solve a mathematical optimization problem in which the
government allocates its scarce resources to investigate each criminal and terror network to
maximize the number of terrorists it detects. We illustrate the model with data collected




The model has three components: the overlapping networks, the investigation process,
and the optimization problem. After solving the optimization problem, we illustrate the
analysis using domestic terror data.
THE OVERLAPPING NETWORKS. Our model contains one terror network indexed
by k = 1 and K − 1 criminal networks indexed by k = 2, . . . , K. There are Nk nodes in
network k that correspond to individuals who take part in terrorist or criminal activities,
and the networks overlap because each individual (i.e., node) belongs to a subset of the K
networks. We define (m1, . . . ,mK) to be the membership vector of an arbitrary node, where
mk = 0 if the node is not a member of network k and mk = 1 if the node is in network
k. The probability a node has a certain membership vector is determined by a multinomial
distribution that defines the overlap among the networks.
Each node in network k has a random number nk of edges in network k, and we assume
that the degree distribution has finite mean and variance. If a node is in multiple networks,
then its degree in one network is independent of its degree in every other network the node
belongs to; we discuss how the model changes if we relax this assumption at the end of
the paper. However, if two nodes are in the same network, their degrees may be correlated
(as in the data analysis in §4.2.3 of the Supporting Information). Activities on each edge
in network k occur according to a Poisson process with parameter λk, and we assume a
node’s activities occur independently along each of its edges. For example, for a drug dealer
network, Nk is the number of drug dealers, nk is the random number of different people that
the dealer sells to, and λk is the number of drug deals per unit time between the dealer and
each person he sells to. In this model, the drug buyers are not included as nodes in the drug
dealer network; these drug user (i.e., buyer) nodes are modeled in the drug user network.
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That is, in the drug dealer network we need not explicitly model the nodes (i.e., drug users)
at the other end of the edges that emanate from a drug dealer node. In contrast, each edge
in the terror network connects two of the N1 terrorists, and activities in the terror network
are viewed as interactions between terrorists (e.g., meetings to plan an attack).
Because our model is independent of the networks’ structures other than the degree
distributions (as explained below equation (1)), we do not need to define an algorithm to
generate specific types of networks that are appropriate for our model. Furthermore, it is
possible to analyze a broad range of network topologies in our model depending upon the
application of interest. For example, the terror network could be scale-free with exponen-
tial truncation as in Qin, Xu, Hu, Sageman, and Chen (2005), or it could consist of many
disconnected clusters that represent terror cells.
NETWORK INVESTIGATION. The government identifies a node in a criminal or
terror network by detecting the node taking part in one of the activities described above.
The government identifies only the node it is investigating and not the people the node is
interacting with; we discuss this issue at the end of the paper. The government investigates
each node independently; i.e., if the government investigates a node this week, it is not more
likely the government will also investigate that node’s neighbors this week. The government
performs two stages of investigation: an initial investigation of the entire set of nodes, and
a secondary investigation of the criminal nodes identified during the initial investigation
that attempts to determine if these nodes also belong to the terror network (e.g., instead of
immediately apprehending these criminals, the government tracks their future behavior).
For the initial investigation of the criminal networks, we consider two budget allotments
denoted by bk and BIk . Let bk be the amount of money that is already being allocated to
criminal network k for the purpose of investigating criminals, where we set b1 = 0. From the
viewpoint of our counterterrorism resource allocation problem, bk is a sunk cost and is not a
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decision variable. However, bk generates criminals that can undergo a secondary investigation
if there is sufficient coordination between crime-fighting and counterterrorism resources, as
discussed further below. Let the decision variable BIk be the additional budget (i.e., beyond
bk) that is allocated to the initial investigation of network k for the sole purpose of detecting
terrorists (i.e., the government is not directly rewarded in our optimization problem for




investigate each of the Nk nodes in network k. Let θIk be a parameter that determines how
efficient the government is at detecting activities in network k during the initial investigation.
The parameter θIk is in units of time/$ and incorporates a conversion factor between dollars
and investigative man-hours that determines how many man-hours are spent investigating
network k, as well as the fact that the government will detect only a fraction of the activities
during its hours of active investigation (which generates a random thinning of the Poisson
process). Also included in the efficiency parameter θIk is the fraction of resources spent
following up on false leads and investigating individuals who are not terrorists or criminals.
Although θIk implicitly accounts for false-positive investigations, our model makes no attempt
(partly due to lack of data) to understand the tradeoff between investigative efficiency and
false positives, and hence cannot control the false-positive detection rate, as is typical in
some detection problems.
Let Y Ik be the random number of nodes in network k identified during the initial
investigation. In (1), the mean of Y Ik is the product of three factors: the average activity
rate in network k (E[nk]λk), the resources spent on the initial investigation of network k
(bk +BIk), and the government’s efficiency during the initial investigation of network k (θ
I
k).
Under the assumption that the number of nodes in network k (Nk) approaches infinity, we
show in §1 of the Supporting Information that each node is identified in at most one network
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during the initial investigation, and





To derive (1), we assume that detection across nodes is independent and the probability of
detecting a node depends only on detecting that node interacting with one of its neighbors,
which itself is a function of the node’s degree. Because the number of detected nodes is
the sum of random variables, the expectation of which is independent of the correlation
structure of these random variables, the quantity in (1) is not impacted by degree-degree
correlations; hence, there is no need to further specify the network structure beyond the
degree distributions.
The government allocates the budget BSk to the secondary investigation of network
k for k = 2, . . . , K. While in practice extensive secondary investigations are likely to be
performed in order to learn the maximum amount about each terrorist cell identified during
the initial investigation (Buckley and Rashbaum, 2007), these secondary investigations of
the terror network are beyond the scope of this paper; i.e., we are focused on maximizing the
number of terrorist cells identified, and ignore how to optimally investigate a terrorist cell
after a terrorist in this cell has been identified. Because we view the initial and secondary







to each secondary investigation of network k. The government determines
that a criminal is a terrorist during the secondary investigation if the government detects
this node participating in a terror interaction. A node in the terror network interacts with
each of its neighbors according to a Poisson process with parameter λ1. The government
detects the terror interactions during the secondary investigation with efficiency parameter
θS1 .
We define T Sk to be the number of terrorists identified during the secondary investigation
of network k. In (2), the mean of T Sk is equal to the expected number of criminals identified
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in network k during the initial investigation (E[Y Ik ] from (1)) times the probability that
a criminal in network k is a terrorist (P[m1 = 1 | mk = 1]) times the probability that














. These factors in turn depend upon the allocation between the initial and
secondary investigative resources (bk + BIk and B
S
k ), the total activity rates (E[nk]λk), and
the investigative efficiencies (θIk and θ
S
1 ). In §2 of the Supporting Information, we show that
as the number of nodes (Nk) tends to infinity,
E[T Sk ] = E[Y
I













Because the assumptions to calculate the values in equations (1)–(2) may break down
for large budget allocations, we cap the mean number of nodes detected during the inves-
tigation by the actual number of nodes (Nk). Therefore, we hereafter replace E[Y Ik ] with
min{E[Y Ik ], Nk}.
THE OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM. The government chooses the investigative budgets
BIk and B
S
k to maximize the expected number of terrorist nodes identified during the in-












min{E[Y I1 ], N1}+
K∑
k=2






k ) = B, (4)
BIk ≥ 0 for k = 1, . . . , K, (5)
BSk ≥ 0 for k = 2, . . . , K, (6)
where E[Y 11 ] and E[T
S
k ] are given in (1)–(2). By (1)–(3), the only knowledge of the net-
work structure required by the government to solve this optimization problem is the degree
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distribution of the terror network (n1), the mean degree of each criminal network (E[nk]
for k = 2, . . . , K), the number of nodes in each network (Nk), and the probability that a
criminal is a terrorist (P[m1 = 1 | mk = 1]).
We consider two variants of problem (3)–(6) that differ by the value of bk in (1). In
the coordinated case, we set bk equal to the existing resources used to initially investigate
criminal network k. In this case, the counterterrorism resources BSk have the ability to
perform secondary investigations of all criminals identified via bk. In the uncoordinated case,
the secondary investigations do not have access to the criminals identified via bk because of
the lack of coordination between the law enforcement resources funded by bk (e.g., local police
or the DEA) and the counterterrorism resources funded by BIk + B
S
k (e.g., FBI). Hence, we
set bk = 0 in the uncoordinated case.
SOLUTION TO THE OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM. The optimization problem is
easier to analyze if we transform the decision variables (BIk , B
S
k ) into the combined budget
to investigate each network, Bk = BIk + B
S
k , and the fraction of this combined budget the




. After making this transformation,
the problem decouples and we can first solve for the optimal γ∗k in terms of Bk. We write
the optimal fraction of resources as γ∗k(Bk) (defined in equation (42) of the Supporting
Information) to explicitly denote its dependence on the budget allocation. After solving for
γ∗k(Bk) for each network, we next solve for the optimal resource allocation across all networks,
which we denote by B∗k. For more details on the solution to the optimization problem, see §3
of the Supporting Information.
The optimal solution is expressed in terms of three intermediate quantities. The first is
P Sk (γk, Bk), which is the probability that the government will determine during the secondary
investigation that a criminal in network k is also a terrorist, given that the criminal is a ter-
rorist. The government’s cost-effectiveness during the initial investigation, eIk, is the average
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number of nodes that the government identifies per dollar spent in the initial investigation of
network k. The final intermediate quantity is the government’s overall cost-effectiveness, ek,
which is the average number of terrorists identified per dollar spent investigating network k.
P Sk (γk, Bk), e
I
k, and ek are defined in equations (41), (43), and (50)–(51) of the Supporting
Information, respectively.
The optimization problem simplifies considerably in the uncoordinated case where
bk = 0. Both the probability P Sk (γk, Bk) and the optimal resource allocation γ
∗
k(Bk) are
independent of Bk, and therefore, we write these quantities as P Sk (γk) and γ
∗
k for the uncoor-
dinated case. In this case the main output of the optimization problem is the government’s
overall cost-effectiveness ek. The optimal solution for the uncoordinated case is to allocate
the entire budget B to the network where the government is most effective at identifying
terrorists (i.e., the network with the largest ek). The value of ek for criminal networks is
defined in equation (51) of the Supporting Information and is the product of four factors: the
government’s cost-effectiveness during the initial investigation (eIk), the probability that a
criminal is a terrorist (P[m1 = 1 | mk = 1]), the fraction of the budget allocated to the initial
investigation (γ∗k), and the likelihood of detecting a criminal as a terrorist in the secondary
investigation (P Sk (γ
∗
k)).
PARAMETER ESTIMATION. We describe the parameter estimation procedure in de-
tail in §4 of the Supporting Information. By equations (1)-(3), the parameters in the opti-
mization problem that we need to estimate are the probability that a criminal in network k is
a terrorist (P[m1 = 1 | mk = 1]), the number of nodes in network k (Nk), the mean degree of
network k (E[nk]), the activity rate over each edge in network k (λk), the efficiency parameter
of network k for the initial investigation (θIk), the fixed law enforcement resources allocated
to the initial investigation of network k in the coordinated case (bk), the efficiency parameter
of the terror network for the secondary investigation (θS1 ), and the degree distribution of the
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terror network (n1).
We use the population of terrorists in the 60 domestic terrorism cases (we aggregate
these 60 cases into 54 cases because the same group of people were involved with several
different cases) analyzed in Smith et al. (2006), which focuses on the activities (both legal
and illegal) terrorists are involved with prior to an attack. Using data from Smith et al.
(2006) and supporting court documents, we construct a terror network of 452 terrorists and
also determine which of these individuals are involved in various criminal networks. More
specifically, although we cannot directly estimate the probabilities P[m1 = 1 | mk = 1] that
a criminal is a terrorist, we know by Bayes’ theorem that




Hence, we indirectly estimate P[m1 = 1 | mk = 1] by estimating the probability P[mk =
1 | m1 = 1] that a terrorist is a criminal from the data in Smith et al. (2006). In addition, we
estimate P[m1=1]
P[mk=1]
by comparing the relative sizes of the networks (i.e., we estimate P[m1 = 1]
by the number of terrorists in the terrorist network, N1, and estimate P[mk = 1] by the
number of criminals in network k, Nk). However, our estimate for the number of terrorists
(N1) is particularly crude.
We calculate the conditional probabilities P[mk = 1 | m1 = 1] for 15 different criminal
networks (table 4 in the Supporting Information). Because the criminal-terror overlap is
small for many of these networks, we restrict our analysis to the six criminal networks with
the largest overlap: the explosives network, the illegal firearms distributor network, the illegal
firearms user network, the bank robbery network, the false documents distributor network,
and the false documents user network. The data from Smith et al. (2006) also allows us to
determine which terrorists interact with each other and how frequently they interact, and
we estimate λ1 and n1 directly from these data.
The remaining parameters are estimated from other data sources. The parameters θIk,
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E[nk], and λk appear in the optimal solution only as the aggregate quantity θIkE[nk]λk, which
can be interpreted as the number of criminals or terrorists detected per initial investigative





, where BˆIk is the annual budget a particular agency (e.g., FBI) allocates to investigate net-
work k (BˆIk coincides with bk for k = 2, . . . , K in the coordinated version of the optimization
problem), and Yˆ Ik is the number of nodes (i.e., criminals) identified annually (for consistency,
we use 2005 data whenever possible). Similarly, by equation (1), the efficiency parameter










with the fraction of preliminary terror investigations that lead to legitimate terror
investigations.
The estimated parameter values all appear in table 1 except for n1, which is given by
the empirical distribution appearing in fig. 1 of the Supporting Information.
[Table 1 about here]
NUMERICAL RESULTS. We begin with the solution to the uncoordinated case (i.e.,
bk = 0). Although the overall cost-effectiveness parameters ek are the most important
numerical output in table 2, we first discuss the various components of ek from equations (50)-
(51) in the Supporting Information. During the initial investigation, the government is least
effective at directly identifying nodes in the terror network (i.e., the terror network has the
smallest value of eIk in table 2), with its effectiveness ranging from a factor of 5 to a factor of
320 lower that those of the criminal networks. This confirms one of the motivating factors
of this work: it should be easier to detect criminals than terrorists. Of the six criminal
networks, two are very large (false documents user and illegal firearms user), and the other
four are much smaller and of nearly identical size. Perhaps not surprisingly, the values of eIk
in table 2 correlate reasonably well with the size of the network; i.e., nodes in larger networks
are easier to detect.
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[Table 2 about here]
The fraction of criminals who are terrorists is small for the two largest networks due to
the needle-in-a-haystack effect (equation (7)): e.g., even though 35% of terrorists are illegal
firearms users (table 1), this network is very large and so the fraction of illegal firearms users
who are terrorists is very small. By (7), for the four smaller networks that are of nearly
equal size, their relative value of the probability a criminal is a terrorist is almost completely
dictated by the probability a terrorist is a criminal. Overall, the range of P[m1 = 1|mk = 1]
varies by a factor of 4800, which is much greater than the variation in the initial effectiveness
eIk.




k) in table 2, which
is consistent with the fact that secondary investigations avoid the needle-in-the-haystack
effect. The values of γ∗k are inversely related to e
I
k: if the government is not effective at
identifying nodes during the initial investigation, then it has to allocate more resources to
the initial investigation to compensate for this ineffectiveness.
The government’s overall cost-effectiveness at identifying terrorists (ek in table 2) is an
order of magnitude greater for the four smaller criminal networks (explosives, illegal firearms
distributor, bank robbery, and false documents distributor) and the terror network than it
is for the two larger criminal networks (illegal firearms user and false documents user). Even
though the government is more effective at directly identifying nodes in the larger criminal
networks (eIk), the variation in the overlap probability (P[m1 = 1|mk = 1])) is nearly two
orders of magnitude greater than the variation in eIk. Therefore, the government’s overall
cost-effectiveness is dominated by the overlap probability in table 2. The range of ek in
table 2 is 960, but the range for the five smaller networks is only 12.
The government is most effective at identifying terrorists through the bank robbery
network, which has the greatest value of ek in table 2, although the values of ek for the terror
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and explosives networks are similar to the bank robbery’s ek. The four smaller criminal
networks are almost identical in size, but the probability a terrorist in our population is
a distributor of illegal firearms or false documents is much smaller than the probability
a terrorist is a member of one of the other criminal networks (table 4 in the Supporting
Information). Illegal firearms and false documents are tools that a terrorist uses to carry out
his plans, and therefore terrorists are much more likely to be users than distributors of these
goods. While there is greater overlap between explosives and terror than bank robbery and
terror, the government is almost an order of magnitude more effective at identifying bank
robbers than it is individuals involved with explosives (eIk in table 2).
The optimal solution in the uncoordinated case uses 32% of the counterterrorism bud-
get to investigate the bank robbery network, with a 60-40% split between the initial and
secondary investigations. This within-network allocation for the bank robbery network is
slightly different than the γ∗k quantity listed in table 2 because the value in table 2 is only valid
if the min operators in equations (42)-(43) of the Supporting Information return the first
term. At this level of resources, every bank robber is identified in the initial investigation,
and the remaining 68% of the budget is devoted to the network that has the second-highest
value of ek, which is the terror network.
Turning to the coordinated solution (table 3), we find that it is optimal to spend 25%
of the counterterrorism budget investigating the bank robbery network; at this level of re-
sources, all bank robbers are detected in the initial investigation. Within the bank robbery
network, resources are almost evenly divided between the secondary investigations and the
additional (i.e., beyond bk) initial investigations. Nearly all of the remaining total countert-
errorism budget is used to investigate the terror network, and a small fraction (1% each) of
the budget is also used to perform secondary investigations of illegal firearms distributors
and the explosives network.
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[Table 3 about here]
The current $1.4B counterterrorism budget detects 824 terrorists in the coordinated
version of the problem, with one-third of them caught via the criminal networks (one-third
of the 54 cases in Smith et al. (2006) were also caught via the criminal networks). If we set
B = $1.4B in the uncoordinated version of the problem, the solution leads to the detection of
748 terrorists (table 2); i.e., coordination leads to a 10% increase in the number of detected
terrorists. If the $1.4B was restricted to being used solely in the terror network, then 700
terrorists would be detected.
We also solved the two versions of the problem for other budget values (fig. 1). In
the uncoordinated case, the government uses its first $0.4B to investigate the bank robbery
network and then allocates the remaining money to the terror network. The number of
detected terrorists is piecewise linear and concave in the budget, with the slope equaling
the ek value of the network receiving the marginal budget. For very small budgets in the
coordinated case, the government relies on the existing initial investigations of criminal
networks and all counterterrorism resources are allocated to the secondary investigation
of the network according to their overlap probability, P[m1 = 1|mk = 1] (in this case,
explosives, then bank robbery, then illegal firearm distributors). Eventually, the government
has enough resources to perform additional initial investigations, which are allocated in the
order of overall cost-effectiveness (bank robbery, then terror network). The solution to the
two cases become more similar as the budget increases.
SENSITIVITY ANALYSES. We perform three variations of our analysis in §5 of the
Supporting Information. The terrorist population in our study is partitioned into four cate-
gories by Smith et al. (2006): right-wing, left-wing, single issue, and international (§5.1 and
tables 1 and 2 of the Supporting Information). We estimate the terror parameters and com-
pute the optimal uncoordinated solution for each category, and the results (§5.1 and table 7
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of the Supporting Information) are similar to the results in table 2. The main difference
between table 2 and table 7 of the Supporting Information is that the terror network has
the largest value of ek for all four categories in table 7 of the Supporting Information. This
is because the probability a criminal is a specific type of terrorist is smaller than the prob-
ability of being a terrorist in general. These calculations also suggest that our results are
quite insensitive to the degree distribution n1 of the terror network (§5.1 of the Supporting
Information).
We also vary the secondary efficiency parameter θS1 , which is difficult to estimate from
data and which plays a pivotal role in whether terrorists can effectively be identified via
their criminal activities. Even after varying θS1 by two orders of magnitude in each direction,
the networks with the four smallest values of ek in table 2 maintain their relative rankings
(table 8 of the Supporting Information). However, for the networks with the three largest
values of ek in table 2, there is some variation with their relative rankings.
We do not have enough information to estimate confidence intervals for the ek values
in table 2. However, to illustrate how the uncertainty in the parameter values affects ek, we
use the standard errors for the conditional probabilities in the second column of table 1 and
assume the other parameter values are normally distributed with coefficients of variation
equal to 0.3, and then generate one million simulated values of ek (§5.3 of the Supporting
Information). The simulation results show that the ek rankings in table 2 are fairly robust
for this level of parameter value uncertainty.
Although our most imprecise parameter estimate is the number of terrorists (N1), the
criminal ek’s are linear in N1, and hence N1 has no impact in the relative rankings of the
criminal networks. However, e1 is independent of N1, and so the value of N1 does influence
the relative effectiveness of investigating criminal networks compared to directly investigating
the terror network. In summary, the sensitivity analyses suggest that the relative rankings
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of the networks change only if the true values of the parameters eIk and P[m1 = 1 | mk = 1]
are much different than the estimates in table 2.
DISCUSSION
RELATED WORK. While there have been studies on mathematical networks of terror-
ist cells (see Jordan and Horsburgh, 2005; Krebs, 2002; Qin et al., 2005; Rodr´ıguez, 2005;
Ressler, 2006; Gutfraind, 2008; Farley, 2003) and work on the connections between crime and
terror in the political science, sociology, and criminology fields (e.g., Hamm, 2005; Dishman,
2005; Hutchinson and O’Malley, 2007), including several empirical studies (Smith et al.,
2006; Hamm, 2005; Smith, Cothren, Roberts, and Damphousse, 2008; Smith and Damphousse,
2002), we are not aware of any mathematical network studies of the crime-terror nexus. Our
overlapping networks model has some similarities to several existing models, but the orienta-
tion is much different; e.g., while our focus is on explicitly optimizing centralized network in-
terdiction, the goals in Palla, Derenyi, Farkas, and Vicsek (2005) andWatts, Dodds, and Newman
(2002), respectively, are to uncover the overlapping network structure and to perform efficient
decentralized search in an overlapping network model.
In addition, our problem is loosely related to two other problems that are concerned
with hidden populations: capture-recapture models and contact-tracing models. While we
are concerned with maximizing the number of individuals identified in a hidden population,
capture-recapture models are used to estimate the size of a hidden population by repeatedly
sampling the population (e.g., wildlife populations) with replacement and comparing the
number of new captures with repeat captures at each sample (Nichols, 1992); this approach
may not be useful in estimating the size of the networks in our model because captured
terrorists and criminals are not likely to be released. Contact tracing is used to reduce
disease transmission by determining who an infected person has had contact with. Contact
tracing models (see Mu¨ller, Kretzschmar, and Dietz, 2000; Kaplan, Craft, and Wein, 2003)
16
have the added complication of being embedded in a dynamic disease transmission model
(although these do not employ overlapping networks), whereas in our model the tracing (i.e.,
interdiction) is the ultimate objective.
RESULTS. The main goal of this investigation is to determine the characteristics of a
criminal network that would allow the government to effectively exploit its terror connections.
In particular, the data caveats discussed below (including the fact that much of the data in
the counterterrorism field is classified) precludes us from making specific recommendations
for how the government should allocate its domestic counterterrorism resources. However,
we have developed a new mathematical framework for thinking about these issues and our
empirical results suggest that the possibility of more effectively catching terrorists via their
precursor criminal activities is worthy of serious consideration. Nonetheless, due to the
secretive nature of this problem domain, we must leave it to government counterterrorism
analysts to assess this study’s usefulness.
Turning to our generic results, the key output of the model in the uncoordinated case
is ek, which is the number of terrorists detected per investigative dollar. Examination of this
quantity in equation (51) of the Supporting Information reveals that the cost-effectiveness
of identifying terrorists in each criminal network depends upon three factors: the cost-
effectiveness of identifying criminals during the initial investigation, the probability that a
criminal is a terrorist, and the effectiveness of the secondary investigation. However, our
empirical analysis suggests that the cost-effectiveness is dominated by the probability that
a criminal is a terrorist, and to a lesser extent by the effectiveness of the initial investigation
(because in table 2 the variation in P[mk = l|m1 = 1] is 1-2 orders of magnitude greater than







both of these factors are partly determined by the size of the criminal network, with smaller
criminal networks generating greater effectiveness. This suggests that the government should
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focus on identifying crimes that are relatively obscure, somewhat easy to detect, and have
appeal to terrorists. In our empirical study, the bank robbery network ranks highest because
it possesses all three characteristics, while explosives ranks next highest among criminal
network because it possesses two of the three characteristics (it is not as easy to detect as
bank robberies). In contrast, while terrorists are reasonably likely to use illegal firearms
and false documents in our empirical study, these network are too large to exploit in a
cost-effective manner.
When the counterterrorism resources are allowed to piggyback on the existing crime-
fighting resources, the government increases the number of terrorists detected by 10% relative
to the uncoordinated case. For realistic budget values, the overall effectiveness ek again dic-
tates which networks to investigate, although in this coordinated case a lower fraction (48%
vs 60%) of the bank robbery budget is allocated to the initial investigation. In practice,
the degree of coordination has improved in the last decade (O’Neil, 2007), but there is still
often more conflict than cooperation among different parts of the government (Stockton,
2009), and neither of the extreme cases (full coordination and no coordination) is realistic.
Several issues would need to be addressed before the government could implement a fully
coordinated criminal and counterterrorism program. A high degree of cooperation and com-
munication among state, local and federal authorities (O’Neil, 2007), as well as among the
various federal agencies, would be required. An assessment would be needed as to how the
core focus and duties of police and other governmental agencies may suffer if their role is
expanded to be part of a larger counterterrorism effort (Stockton, 2009).
DATA CAVEATS. The primary reason why our empirical study cannot directly inform
current counterterrorism policy is that the terror population from Smith et al. (2006) is
vastly different than the current relevant terror population. The terror population in this
study is from 1971–2003 and includes several categories of terrorism (e.g., left-wing and
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environmental) that may not be as much of a concern now or in the future as other types of
terrorism (e.g., Islamic Jihad). Indeed, the time span of our empirical data is longer than
the time scale over which these operations evolve; however, a temporal analysis (data not
shown) of the data from Smith et al. (2006) was not fruitful due to the low frequency rate of
terror attacks. Furthermore, the cases in Smith et al. (2006) may not be representative of the
terrorists active between 1971–2003 for two reasons. First, there could be selection bias; e.g.,
perhaps larger terror cells, or terrorists of certain types (e.g., right-wing terrorists appear
to be less professional than left-wing terrorists in our study) were easier to detect during
this time period. Second, this study selects cases for analysis based upon the availability
of sources, and thus the “ability to infer to all terrorists groups is negatively affected”
(Smith et al., 2006).
Court documents provide a valuable source to determine which nodes interact with
each other and how frequently, but we were unable to gain access to court documents for
every case in our data set (§4.1 in the Supporting Information). However, even if we did have
court documents for each case, they are not perfect sources for our analysis. The purpose
of the court documents is not to provide a detailed account of a terrorist group, and the
interactions captured in the court documents represent only a fraction of the activity that
actually occurred. While it is tempting to view our estimates of the degree distribution n1
and the frequency λ1 in the terror network as lower bounds on the true values, this data
censoring could be offset by the selection bias mentioned above.
Another shortcoming of the data is that the specific information needed to estimate the
parameters in table 1 does not always exist (or we could not find them). We assume that the
data used to estimate Yˆ Ik and Bˆ
I
k correspond to values from an initial investigation, but this
may not be an accurate assumption; data separated by initial vs. secondary investigation
would be helpful. Furthermore, we assume all authorities (state, local, and federal) have the
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same parameters values. In reality, each agency has its own abilities and efficiencies that
determine the agency’s investigative effectiveness for each network. Finally, several of the
parameters values in table 1 are derived from assumptions and approximations and are not
precise estimates. In particular, the size of the terror network N1 (§4.2.4 in the Supporting
Information) and the parameters for users and distributors of false documents (§4.3.4 in the
Supporting Information) are rough estimates.
MODEL EXTENSIONS. One limitation of our model is that it fails to allow the terrorists
to modify their participation in criminal activities based upon the government’s budget
allocation. However, this failure to model the problem in a game-theoretic framework is
not as big a concern in our model as it is in other homeland security applications where
the budget allocations are more public (e.g., homeland security budget allocations to state
governments for protecting critical infrastructure are publicly available - here there is no
reason to expect the budget allocation to be made public), and furthermore because the
intelligence tracking of individual terrorists and criminals is covert, the effort expended by
government agents will be difficult to observe. Nonetheless, one could embed our model
into a Stackelberg game (Gibbons, 1992) in which the government makes budget allocation
decisions and then the terrorists observe information about this allocation and decide which
precursor criminal activities to participate in. A challenge with this model extension is to
determine the terrorists’ objective function, which would require data that might be difficult
to obtain even in the classified arena.
In such a formulation, the terrorists may require certain types of assets (a weapon, some
money, identification documents), and the terrorists may have several legal and illegal ways
of obtaining each type of asset. An optimal budget allocation would equalize the net benefit
(e.g., the likelihood of success, perhaps minus the cost, if this varies widely across options)
of each option to the terrorist. Consequently, a game-theoretic formulation would cause the
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government to focus more on criminal activities for which few viable options exist (e.g., false
documents, money laundering, explosives) and less in, e.g., money-making activities (e.g.,
drug dealing) for which safer options exist (note that in the data set we use from Smith et al.
(2006), the bank robberies come from a handful of cases during the early 1980s and are not
representative of the criminal activities of today’s terror population).
A more realistic game would include multiple time periods and would allow terrorists
to update their estimates of the government’s resource allocations indirectly only via the
apprehension of associated terrorists (this local information may not be a reliable signal
about the global resource allocation). Perhaps the most beneficial aspect of a dynamic model
would be to examine how the government could influence the terrorists’ beliefs about the
government’s resource allocation (e.g., by spreading false information about counterterrorism
operations) so that the terrorists update their parameters in a manner that is beneficial to
the government.
We assume that if a node belongs to multiple networks, its degree in one network is
independent of its degrees in all other networks. Consequently, the last term in equation (2)
is an expectation with respect to the terror network degree distribution P[n1 = r]. If there
are correlations between a node’s degree in the terror network and its degree in network k,
then the the last term in (2) would be computed with respect to the degree distribution
defined by P[n1 = r]
E[nk | n1=r]
E[nk]
(the steps to show this are similar to the analysis in §2 of
the Supporting Information). If this conditional degree distribution is known, then the last
term in equation (2) can be appropriately modified, but the ensuing analysis will remain the
same.
In our model, the government identifies only the node it is directly investigating during
the initial investigation and not the neighbors that the node is interacting with. In practice,
the government may sometimes also identify the neighbor when it detects an interaction.
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Asymptotically, the government will detect a node taking part in at most one interaction
during the initial investigation (the steps to show this are similar to the analysis in §1 of the
Supporting Information). Therefore, the number of criminals and terrorists identified during
the initial investigation would be multiplied by two if the neighbor is also identified during
an interaction.
On a related note, during the secondary investigations in our model, the government
could determine not only other networks that nodes belong to, but also neighbors of nodes.
Our model could, in theory, allow the government to walk through the network in this way
identifying neighbors-of-neighbors-of-neighbors . . . of a node originally detected in the initial
investigation (akin to tracing contacts-of-contacts in §4.2 of Kaplan et al. (2003)). However,
this would greatly complicate the analysis (e.g., accounting for clustering and degree corre-
lations within the networks) and require much more data about the overlap distribution and
would lead to strategies that consume an unrealistically high level of detection resources.
In our model, the government cannot identify isolated nodes in a network; hence, an
isolated terrorist node could never be apprehended as a terrorist, even if he was detected
participating in criminal networks. To partially address this shortcoming, we could add
nonhuman nodes to the terror network that represent the target (e.g., so that the interaction
is surveillance of the target).
Another shortcoming of our model is the assumption that the number of identified
nodes is linear in the budget. This relationship would be concave for large budgets due to
decreasing marginal returns, and could be convex for very small budgets due to economies of
scale. While a smoother nonlinear relationship than the capping by Nk used in equation (3)
would change the quantitative solution to our optimization problem, it would not affect the
model’s basic qualitative behavior.
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Terror 1 2000 5.09 5.5× 10−2 1.79× 10−6 1.79× 10−4 5.00× 10−7
Explosives 0.451 6000 – – – – 2.42× 10−6
Illegal Firearms User 0.350 2× 106 – – – – 2.88× 10−5
Illegal Firearms Distributor 0.064 6000 – – – – 7.03× 10−6
Bank Robbery 0.217 5000 – – – – 1.88× 10−5
False Documents User 0.155 107 – – – – 1.60× 10−4
False Documents Distributor 0.022 5000 – – – – 1.31× 10−5
Table 1: Parameter Estimates. These parameters are the probability that a terrorist is in
a given criminal network (P[mk = 1 | m1 = 1]), the network size (Nk), the mean of the
degree distribution of the terror network (E[n1]), the annual interaction rate of the terror
network (λ1), the efficiency parameters for the terror network (θI1 and θ
S
1 ), and the mega-
parameter θIkE[nk]λk, which is the cost-effectiveness of the initial investigation (defined as
eIk in equation (43) in the Supporting Information).
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Terror 2× 103 5.00× 10−7 – – – 5.00× 10−7 0.68 478
Explosives 6× 103 2.42× 10−6 1.5× 10−1 0.84 0.76 2.31× 10−7 0 0
Illegal Firearms User 2× 106 2.88× 10−5 3.5× 10−4 0.58 0.55 3.19× 10−9 0 0
Illegal Firearms Distributor 6× 103 7.03× 10−6 2.1× 10−2 0.74 0.68 7.62× 10−8 0 0
Bank Robbery 5× 103 1.88× 10−5 8.7× 10−2 0.63 0.59 6.11× 10−7 0.32 270
False Documents User 107 1.60× 10−4 3.1× 10−5 0.36 0.35 6.36× 10−10 0 0
False Documents Distributor 5× 103 1.31× 10−5 8.8× 10−3 0.68 0.63 4.89× 10−8 0 0
Table 2: Numerical results for the uncoordinated case. The primary output is the overall
cost-effectiveness ek. Also included are the network size (Nk), the cost-effectiveness of the
initial investigation (eIk), the probability that a criminal is a terrorist (P[m1 = 1|mk = 1]),
and the probability that a terrorist is detected during the secondary investigation (P Sk ). The
optimal solution is given by the fraction of the budget used for the initial investigation (γ∗k)






. The last column gives















Terror – – – 0.73 511
Explosives 1.19× 108 0 0.69 0.01 30
Illegal Firearms User 3.18× 108 – – 0 0
Illegal Firearms Distributor 2.73× 108 0 0.31 0.01 13
Bank Robbery 108 0.48 0.62 0.25 270
False Documents User 5× 108 – – 0 0
False Documents Distributor 108 – – 0 0
Table 3: Numerical results for the coordinated case. The original budget for the initial
investigations in the criminal networks is bk. The optimal solution is given by the fraction
of the budget used for the initial investigation (γ∗k(B
∗
k)) and the fraction of the total budget






. The last column gives the number of terrorists identified
in each network for a budget of $1.4B.
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Figure Legends
Fig. 1. The solution to the (a) uncoordinated and (b) coordinated versions of problem (3)–
(6) for varying budget levels. The right vertical axis measures the optimal number of ter-
rorists identified (· · · ) and the number of terrorists identified if the entire $1.4B budget is
allocated to investigating the terror network (∗). The left vertical axis measures the fraction
of the total budget B allocated to the initial (—) and secondary (- - -) investigations for the
terror network (black), the bank robbery network (red), the explosives network (green) and
the illegal firearms distribution network (blue).
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